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GETTING WHAT YOU NEED: HOW REPUTATION AND STATUS AFFECT TEAM 
PERFORMANCE, HIRING, AND SALARIES IN THE NBA 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study how the reputation and status of resource providers affect the two organizational 
outcomes of product quality and revenues, hiring decisions, and prices paid to resource 
providers. We argue that reputation and status have different effects on outcomes: reputation has 
a stronger effect on product quality, and status has a stronger effect on revenues. Building on 
this, we argue that actual quality mediates the effect of reputation on revenues more than the 
effect of status on revenues. Moreover, reputation and status have different effects on how 
organizations acquire resources: when their product quality is low relative to their aspiration 
level, organizations will display a preference for recruiting high-reputation resource providers 
over high-status ones. Conversely, organizations will display a preference for recruiting high-
status resource providers over high-reputation ones when their revenue is low relative to their 
aspiration level. Finally, although both reputation and status have positive effects on the price 
paid for a resource, we argue that the relationship between reputation and pay is weaker for high-
status resource providers. We find support for our hypotheses in a sample of NBA players and 
teams. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, two related but distinct streams of research have focused on the value that 
reputation and status bring to organizations. The first stream argues that organizations use 
reputation, which is based on observed past actions, to infer the skills, knowledge, and quality of 
a resource provider (e.g., Lee, Pollock, & Jin, 2011). Organizations acquiring resources from 
high-reputation actors thus expect these resources to have a positive effect on their performance 
(Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun, 1996; Rao, 1994). The second stream argues that organizations use 
status, which is based on relative position in a hierarchical order, as a proxy for the quality of a 
resource provider (Podolny, 1993; Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006). Organizations 
acquiring resources from high-status actors receive certification benefits that affect the market’s 
perception of the value of these organizations. Although these two streams have considered the 
role of either reputation or status on firms’ assessment and selection of resource providers, 
attempts have also been made to consider the concurrent role of both types of intangible assets. 
For instance, Washington and Zajac (2005) have shown that reputation and status have 
independent effects on the selection of NCAA teams for post-season tournaments. Meanwhile, 
Jensen and Roy (2008) have shown that the choice of exchange partners is a sequential process 
whereby reputation is used to choose a specific firm after a particular status bracket is chosen. 
However, what remains lacking is an integrated understanding of the role these intangible assets 
play in achieving organizational goals and how this role affects the selection and pay of resource 
providers with different levels of reputation and status.  
Because organizations have multiple and possibly interdependent goals (Cyert & March, 
1963), the value of resources should vary depending on how reputation and status help 
organizations to reach their goals. Although both reputation and status are intangible assets that 
bring benefits to an organization, the nature of the benefits derived from each asset varies 
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(Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2011; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Pollock, Chen, 
Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). By explicitly considering 
multiple organizational goals, this study extends our understanding of the effects of reputation 
and status on organizational outcomes as well as on recruitment and pay decisions. Because the 
effects that assets have on organizational outcomes differ, the recruitment of resource providers 
depends on the extent to which an organization requires particular types of assets to meet its 
goals and which resource providers possess these assets. Consequently, an organization’s 
valuations of reputation and status are interdependent and not independent (Washington & Zajac, 
2005) or sequential (Jensen & Roy, 2008), as might happen when considering one organizational 
goal at a time.  
In line with the conceptualization and findings from past research, we begin by arguing 
that both assets have a positive effect on the product quality and the revenues of an organization, 
which are the two goals we consider. However, we argue that these intangible assets contribute 
differently to these two goals. Between the two types of assets, reputation has a stronger effect 
on quality, whereas status has a stronger effect on revenues. Consistent with the closer link 
between reputation and quality than that between status and quality, we also predict that the 
actual quality will mediate the effect of reputation on revenues to a greater extent than it will 
mediate the effect of status on revenues. Consequently, organizational actions will be directed 
toward obtaining resources whose level of intangible assets are more closely linked to the goal in 
pursuit of which remedial action needs to be taken more urgently. Therefore, to the extent that 
organizations’ performance in terms of product quality is low relative to their aspiration level, 
they will be more likely to acquire more resources from high-reputation providers than from 
high-status ones. Conversely, to the extent that the organizations’ revenue performance is low 
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relative to their aspiration level, they will be more likely to acquire more resources from high-
status providers than from high-reputation providers. Finally, although the price organizations 
pay for resources depends positively on both reputation (Fang, 2005) and status (Benjamin & 
Podolny, 1999), the different effects of these factors on goals and hiring suggest that their effects 
on pay may not be independent of each other. In particular, because status is less sensitive than 
reputation to changes in past quality, and because high-status actors are less subject to scrutiny, 
we argue that there will be a weaker link between reputation and pay for resources obtained from 
a high-status provider.  
To summarize, we study the concurrent effects of status and reputation on product quality 
and revenues. By doing so, we develop clear and consistent predictions regarding the different 
effects of each intangible asset on these two goals and on recruitment decisions, as well as the 
interdependence between them in determining the payment for these assets. Our predictions 
receive support from the analysis of longitudinal data on a sample of NBA teams and players. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A central task faced by organizations is the acquisition of resources, which are then 
combined to develop, manufacture, and deliver products and services. Because they have 
multiple, potentially interdependent goals (Cyert & March, 1963), organizations assess resource 
providers on dimensions that are important for the organization to reach its goals. These 
dimensions can vary from attributes of materials, such as the quality or appellation of grapes in 
the production of wine (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), to the attributes of employees, such as the 
productivity and visibility of securities analysts (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008), the 
leadership, decision-making skills, or certifications of CEOs (Wade et al., 2006), to the effort 
resource providers expend to help organizations remedy their problems (Castellucci & Ertug, 
'"
"
2010). As these examples suggest, the attributes of the resource providers and the resources they 
bring need not be uni-dimensional in helping an organization pursue its goals, which leads 
organizations to assess resource providers on potentially more than one attribute.  
The extent to which an organization can accomplish its goals depends on the resources it 
receives from its members or employees. Consequently, organizations enter the labor market, 
where employees exchange their participation, time, and effort in return for money (Coleman, 
1990). Once individuals are members of the organization, an exchange between the parties is 
present in that individuals have something to contribute, i.e., their participation, knowledge, 
skills, and obtain continued employment, salary, or bonuses in exchange (Thompson, 1967). This 
exchange is maintained as long as the inducement provided by the organization to the employee 
balances the contribution offered by the employee to the organization (March & Simon, 1958).  
Because organizations have multiple and distinct goals that might not be reached 
simultaneously (Cyert & March, 1963), they might build their expectations, shape their choices, 
and take actions to pursue at least one of these goals with greater effort. Two important goals 
worth examining are the quality of the products produced by the organization and the revenues 
generated by these products (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Stuart, 2000). Because reputation and 
status are intangible assets that affect organizational outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Pollock et al., 
2010), we argue that both the reputation and status of a resource provider will have an effect on 
an organization’s product quality and revenues. 
Reputation has been introduced and used by different theoretical approaches, which have 
led to different definitions of the concept. Reputation is considered to be a signal that predicts the 
future behavior, performance, or quality of actors based on their previously observed behavior, 
performance, or quality in both economic (Shapiro, 1983; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988; Wilson, 
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1985) and sociological accounts (e.g., Raub & Weesie, 1990). In research on management and 
organizations, there are notable differences in how reputation is defined and operationalized 
(Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011), and attempts to reconcile these differences have led to integrative 
definitions of the concept that include, for instance, both the past actions and prominence of an 
actor (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). In this paper, we follow Jensen et al. 
(2012) and Jensen and Roy (2008), who argued that reputation should be defined as an attribute-
specific assessment, considering it an “expectation of future behavior that is directly based on 
past demonstrations of that behavior” (p. 497). Therefore, reputation is an intangible asset that 
produces value to the actor possessing it in that it signals to potential customers a specific 
attribute through the actors’ past actions (Rindova & Martins, 2012). Because we consider firms 
in their efforts to acquire high-quality resources, the relevant attribute we use to define reputation 
in this paper is the quality of resources provided by an actor. Consequently, the value of the 
intangible asset of reputation for quality used to assess an actor will be based on the past 
demonstration of quality by that actor.  
Status is based on the relative position of an actor in a hierarchical order and is not 
necessarily tightly coupled to past behaviors (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Podolny, 2005). Information 
about the status of actors can be gathered using observable factors such as the institution where 
they obtained their educational degree (Stuart & Ding, 2006), the awards they were granted 
(Wade et al., 2006), or the prestige of actors (Rossman, Esparza, & Bonacich, 2010) or firms 
they have previously worked with (Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008). Status is an intangible 
asset that produces value to the actor possessing it in that it signals to potential customers the 
actor’s prestige or esteem accorded to actors by the positions they occupy in a social structure 
(Gould, 2002). The underlying assumption required for status to function as a valuable intangible 
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asset is that education, awards, and the prestige of either affiliates or previous places of work are 
more readily observable than quality itself. Nevertheless, education, awards, and the prestige of 
either affiliates or previous places of work are assumed to be correlated with quality (Podolny, 
1994); consequently, high-status actors are expected to have superior abilities (Pollock et al., 
2010; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Organizations prefer to work with or employ high-status 
actors because by using their resources or employing them, an organization can increase its own 
status, consequently enjoying the benefits associated with it (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Pollock 
et al., 2010; Pollock & Gulati, 2007; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). 
Focusing first on product quality, we know that the quality of a firm’s products is 
partially determined by the quality of resources used as inputs (Barney, 1991; Moran & Ghoshal, 
1999). Because resources from either high-reputation or high-status providers should be of 
higher quality than resources from either low-reputation or low-status providers, both intangible 
assets should have a positive effect on the quality of the final product. However, their relative 
effects may differ. On the one hand, actors who have a high reputation for quality are expected to 
provide high-quality resources and thus increase the quality of the final product of the 
organization that is using their resources. On the other hand, although a status ranking may have 
originally been formed on the basis of differences in performance (Podolny, 2005), the indicators 
of status are less directly tied to quality than reputation (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Podolny, 2005; 
Washington & Zajac, 2005: 294). To the extent that there exists some decoupling between past 
demonstrations of quality and status, an actor may maintain its high status for some time, even 
when its past demonstrations of quality have been declining. Therefore, it would be more likely 
for a high-reputation actor to provide high-quality resources than for a high-status actor to 
provide high-quality resources. Consequently, although both effects are expected to be positive, 
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an actor’s reputation should have a stronger effect on the quality of the organization’s final 
product than the actor’s status. 
 
H1a: The effect of the reputation of an organization’s resource providers on the 
quality of the organization’s products will be greater than the effect of the status of 
resource providers on the quality of the organization’s products. 
 
The second organizational goal that we consider is revenues. We argue that both 
reputation and status should have a positive effect on revenues through the two determinants of 
revenues: the sales volume and the product price. Insofar as customers prefer to consume 
products of higher quality, we can expect, ceteris paribus, products of higher quality to have 
higher sales. Therefore, products manufactured using higher-quality resources should have 
higher sales than products manufactured with lower-quality resources. Because both reputation 
and status should correlate with quality, we expect both of them to have a positive effect on the 
sales volume of the final product. Similarly, reputation and status should have a positive effect 
on the price paid for the final product. In their study of Californian wineries, Benjamin and 
Podolny (1999) showed that both the reputation and status of a winery have independent and 
positive effects on the price of a bottle of wine. However, if status acts as a certification of an 
actor’s quality, it will be more readily observable than past demonstrations of quality, i.e., 
reputation (Podolny, 1993, 2005). In other words, by being more easily observable by the 
audience for the final product of the firm, status should have a larger impact than reputation on 
the perception of quality. Customers will be more influenced by status than by reputation in their 
perception of the quality of a product and thus will be more likely to pay a higher price for a 
product manufactured with resources from a high-status provider. As a result, the effect of a 
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resource provider’s status will be higher on the revenues of an organization than the effect of 
reputation. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
 
H1b: The effect of the status of an organization’s resource providers on the 
organization’s revenues will be greater than the effect of the reputation of 
resource providers on the organization’s revenues. 
 
As we have suggested in developing H1b, the effect of status on revenues should be 
stronger than the effect of reputation on revenues because of the more visible endorsement 
effect derived from working with high-status resource providers. Status is then an intangible 
asset that is valuable for the organization in that, through endorsement, it makes the 
organization more visible, more valuable, and more desirable in the eyes of the organization’s 
audience. However, although it is per se also a valuable intangible asset for the organization, 
reputation is mostly linked to increased revenues through increases in the quality of resources. 
If these are indeed the different mechanisms through which the status and reputation of 
resource providers affect the organization’s revenues, there should be a difference in the degree 
to which these effects are mediated by the actual quality of the organization’s final products. 
Because it primarily takes place through the increased quality of resources, the effect of 
reputation on revenues, compared to the effect of status, should be mediated to a greater degree 
by the actual performance of the organization. In other words, we argue that the reputation of 
resource providers has an effect on revenues because it signals the quality of the final product, 
which in turn should produce an increase in both quantity and price. However, because 
customers will draw inferences on the quality of a product more directly when the product 
becomes available than through the reputation of the resource providers, the effect of reputation 
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should be mediated by the actual quality of the product. Conversely, because the status of 
resource providers will act as an endorsement of the final product, and because this endorsement 
might be more visible and easier to assess than the quality of the product itself, the mediation of 
the effect of status on revenues by the actual product quality should be smaller. Therefore, we 
predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The mediation of the effect of the reputation of resource providers 
on revenues by the actual quality of final products will be greater than the 
mediation of the effect of the status of resource providers on revenues by the actual 
quality of final products. 
 
This hypothesis allows us to test one of the implications of our reasoning behind the 
different effects of reputation and status on different outcomes by providing evidence for why 
organizations may prefer working with high-status resource providers, even in the face of less 
than ideal quality. The positive effects of high-status resource providers work less through the 
mechanism of producing actual quality than through the endorsement mechanism on revenue 
goals. 
Problemistic search, a central proposition of the behavioral theory of the firm, suggests 
that firms engage in search activities because they are confronted by a specific problem and are 
then directed to find a solution to that problem (Cyert & March, 1963). This proposition has led 
to a large body of research that studies the effect of a firm’s performance on the likelihood of 
specific actions (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Greve, 1998, 2003b; March, 1988). 
In particular, the focus has been on how a firm’s actions are influenced by how that firm’s 
performance compares to the firm’s aspiration levels. Aspiration levels are threshold levels 
!#"
"
discriminating between a firm’s success and failure, providing the firm with a reference point 
that triggers problemistic search. In general, firms will be more likely to seek solutions to 
problems when their performance is different from their aspiration levels (Baum et al., 2005; 
Greve, 2003a, 2003b; Iyer & Miller, 2008; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992).  
Cyert and March (1963) emphasized that organizations try to meet their aspiration levels 
for multiple goals, and scholars have since studied how such multiple aspirations affect firm 
behavior. For instance, Baum and his colleagues (Baum et al., 2005) studied how two different 
goals, market share and network status, affect a firm’s propensity to enter nonlocal relationships, 
and Greve (2008) explored how sequential attention to performance and size goals affects firm 
growth. We suggest that because organizations have multiple goals, they will initiate 
problemistic searches to the extent that their performance is low relative to their aspirations for 
these different goals. Consequently, their actions will be directed toward obtaining resources 
whose level of intangible assets are more closely linked to the goal on which remedial action is 
more urgently needed. We have focused on two organizational outcomes, product quality and 
revenues, and argued that reputation has a larger effect than status on product quality and that 
status has a larger effect than reputation on revenues. This argument suggests that organizations 
facing performance issues on one outcome should focus on the intangible asset with the closer 
link to that outcome to address this issue, acquiring resources accordingly. Consistent with the 
idea of myopic search, whereby an organization seeks solutions in the neighborhood of a 
problem (Cyert & March, 1963), an organization that is performing low relative to its aspiration 
level on quality outcomes should be more likely to prefer high-reputation resource providers 
over high-status ones in their recruitment. To the extent that the reputation of resource providers 
has a greater effect than their status on the quality of the final product, this recruitment will allow 
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the organization to improve its quality performance. Conversely, an organization that is 
performing highly relative to its aspiration level on quality will be less likely to show a 
preference for high-reputation resource providers over high-status ones in their recruitment. 
Similarly, an organization that is performing low relative to its aspiration level on revenue 
outcomes is more likely to prefer high-status resource providers over high-reputation ones to 
improve its revenue performance. Conversely, an organization performing highly relative to its 
aspiration level on revenue outcomes will be less likely to demonstrate such a preference.  
Clearly, organizations would like to obtain resources that are both high-reputation and 
high-status to allow them to perform better on both outcomes. However, to the extent that the 
reputation and status of actors are not perfectly correlated, organizations may not always be able 
to obtain resources that are both high-reputation and high-status. Because financial resources are 
also limited, organizations will need to constrain their choices by focusing on one intangible 
asset over the other. We thus hypothesize the following:  
 
H3a: As the performance of an organization, relative to aspirations, on the quality 
of their products decreases, the organization will be likely to recruit more high-
reputation resource providers than high-status resource providers. 
 
H3b: As the performance of an organization, relative to aspirations, on revenues 
decreases, the organization will be likely to recruit more high-status resource 
providers than high-reputation resource providers. 
 
Once organizations have determined the resources they require to meet their currently 
more pressing goal, they need to determine the price to pay for them. Because organizations 
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require either more high-reputation or high-status resources, we argue that this price will depend 
on the levels of such intangible assets possessed by resource providers.  
In his seminal work on reputation, Shapiro (1983) demonstrated that high-reputation 
products sell at a premium in markets where the quality of products cannot be observed before 
purchase. Similarly, empirical studies have shown that negative reputation, measured as a 
percentage of negative feedback, reduces selling prices on eBay auctions (Mickey, 2010), that 
positive reputation increases the price premium in online auctions for mobile phones (Obloj & 
Capron, 2011), and that more reputable investment banks can charge higher fees and obtain 
lower yields (Fang, 2005). To the extent that the quality of resources acquired has an effect on 
the quality of an organization’s own products (Barney, 1991), we expect organizations to pay 
higher prices for resources obtained from high-reputation providers because of the expected 
positive effect on the quality of the organization’s final products, as hypothesized in H1a. 
Research has shown that actors pay higher prices for services or resources obtained from 
high-status actors, such as higher prices of wines produced by high-status wineries (Benjamin & 
Podolny, 1999) or the higher compensation of prestigious executives and directors (Chen et al., 
2008). These suggest that organizations are willing to pay higher prices to obtain resources that 
would certify their association with high-status resource providers, resulting in increased status-
related benefits for the organization, such as higher revenues, as hypothesized in H1b.  
However, the different effects of status and reputation on organizational goals and 
recruitment suggest that their effects on the pay of a resource provider may not be independent of 
each other. As a resource provider’s status increases, and as the organization expects to secure 
the benefits associated with high status, the organization will be less concerned of also securing 
reputation-related benefits from that same resource provider. Conversely, the organization will 
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be more concerned about securing the benefits associated with reputation from a non-high-status 
resource provider.  
Building on Weber (1978), Washington and Zajac (2005) clarified the analytical 
distinction between reputation and status. The authors argued that whereas reputation captures 
differences in quality or merit that generate performance-based rewards, status captures 
differences in social rank that generate privileges not related to performance. Actors that either 
display high-quality actions or produce high-quality products develop a reputation for high 
quality. Such a reputation will signal their ability to provide high-quality resources, thereby 
granting them the rewards associated with their merit. In contrast, status is based on a social 
ordering of actors agreed upon by relevant audiences. A high position in this ordering will grant 
privileges to actors occupying it. Whereas actors’ positions in the status ordering are partly 
determined by their past quality or performance, once it is formed, a status ordering is slower to 
change – when compared to changes in one’s reputation – in the face of changes in quality or 
performance, as has been suggested by Washington and Zajac (2005: 294). This phenomenon 
occurs due to the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968), whereby once a status ordering is established, 
it tends to perpetuate itself and the privileges associated with it, independently of a merit-based 
system (Podolny, 1993; Stinchcombe, 1965; Weber, 1978). Along this line, Washington and 
Zajac (2005) find that once NCAA basketball teams have been invited to a postseason 
tournament (i.e., become high-status), they are more likely to be invited to postseason 
tournaments independently of their performance in the current year and in the previous four 
years. Arguably, when trying to secure the participation of high-status teams, the organizers of 
postseason tournaments will be less interested in the teams’ most recent performance than their 
status, as status is less sensitive than reputation to changes in performance. Similarly, Podolny 
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(1993) has argued that high-status investment banks are subject to less due diligence than low-
status investment banks when asked to lead a syndicate to underwrite corporate securities. After 
an actor becomes high-status, the quality of that actor’s products will be under less scrutiny than 
the products of non-high-status actors. This relationship suggests that there is a looser link 
between reputation and pay when determining the price to pay for resources from a high-status 
provider. Conversely, organizations impose a tighter link between reputation and pay for 
resources obtained from a non-high-status provider. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H4: The positive relationship between a resource provider’s reputation and the 
price paid by the organization decreases as the resource provider’s status 
increases. 
 
THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of players and teams in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA). One of the four North American professional major sports leagues, the NBA 
was founded in 1946 as the Basketball Association of America, adopted the name “National 
Basketball Association” after merging with the rival National Basketball League in 1949, and in 
1976, merged with the rival American Basketball Association. The NBA is currently composed 
of thirty teams, twenty-nine from the USA and one from Canada, divided between two 
conferences (Eastern and Western), each with three divisions (Atlantic, Central, Southeast and 
Northwest, Pacific, Southwest) containing five teams each. The rules of player contracts, trades, 
revenue distribution, the Draft, and the salary cap are dictated by the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA), signed between the NBA and the NBA Players Association. 
Several features of the NBA make it particularly well suited for testing our hypotheses. 
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First, because we consider players to be the resource providers, there are objective measures of 
their quality. The quality of a player, despite the heterogeneity of players’ positions, can be 
assessed by measuring his performance. For instance, the number of rebounds, the percentage of 
field goals, and total points scored are statistics readily available to audiences. However, despite 
such objective measures of quality, there is uncertainty in how well a player’s current quality 
predicts his future quality (in our sample, the correlation of a player’s performance between two 
seasons is .57). Consequently, the second reason for choosing this setting is that teams’ decisions 
regarding which players to add to their roster, to retain on the team, or to trade/release are also 
based on certifications of quality. Similar to the evaluation of a CEO’s quality (Wade et al., 
2006), in this setting, quality is also assessed by certifications given to players through awards 
(e.g., the Most Valuable Player award) or selection for special teams (e.g., for the NBA-All Star 
Game or All-NBA Teams), whose composition is voted on by coaches, sportswriters, 
broadcasters, and fans. Third, although there are regulations governing the competitive balance 
among teams, the players’ market is an active one. Players can change teams and negotiate 
salaries despite the presence of a soft salary cap. In addition, because of exceptions to the salary 
cap,1 players can also renegotiate their salary with their current team. Therefore, the effects of a 
player’s status and reputation on his salary are particularly relevant in this context. Fourth, teams 
have different objectives to pursue. On the one hand, they are interested in their athletic 
performance on the court. On the other hand, they are also interested in increasing their revenues 
through ticket sales, merchandise, and television rights. Although these objectives can be 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 In addition to its presence in the 1940s, the NBA has had a salary cap, based on a percentage of the NBA revenues, since the 1984/5 season. The 
salary cap imposes a limit on the total salary of a team’s players, aiming to ensure a balance among teams. There are several exceptions to the 
NBA salary cap, making it a “soft” cap. A soft cap allows teams to enter contracts with their current players at salary levels that would put the 
team above the cap. Therefore, teams can, de facto, exceed the salary cap to sign players. To curb this, a further luxury tax payment is required 
from teams whose payroll exceeds a “tax level.” The “tax” for teams exceeding this is to pay one dollar to the league for each payroll dollar 
exceeding the level set. Even with this condition, teams do exceed the tax level to sign players. In 2005-06, with a salary cap of $49.5 million and 
a luxury tax of $61.7 million, the New York Kicks’ payroll was $124 million, putting them $74.5 million above the salary cap and $62.3 million 
above the tax line. 
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regarded as complementary, we claim that they are distinct and pursued as such by teams 
through alternative strategies. In our sample, a modest correlation of .31 between athletic 
performance and ticket income in the same season suggests that focusing only on athletic 
performance may not guarantee adequate financial returns.  
Our hypotheses translate to the NBA setting as follows: H1a predicts that the average 
reputation of players on a team will have a greater effect than the average status of the team 
roster (or, equally, the proportion of high-status players on the team) on the team’s season 
performance; H1b predicts that the average status of players on a team (or, equivalently, the 
proportion of high-status players on a team) will have a greater effect than the average reputation 
of the team’s players on the team’s ticket income. H2 predicts that the effect of reputation on 
ticket income will be mediated by the team’s actual on-court performance in that season to a 
greater degree than the effect of status on ticket income. H3a predicts that low performance in 
the previous season relative to aspiration levels will increase the likelihood that the team will 
recruit more new high-reputation players than new high-status players for the current season, 
whereas H3b predicts that low ticket income in the previous season relative to aspiration levels 
will increase the likelihood that the team will recruit more new high-status players than new 
high-reputation players for the current season. H4 predicts that the positive relationship between 
a player’s reputation and his salary will be weaker if the player is high-status. 
DATA AND METHODS 
We tested our hypotheses using longitudinal data from the 1989/1990 season to the 
2004/2005 season. Data on player performance, demographics, and team performance were 
coded from the Official NBA Guide 2005-2006 (Sporting News & NBA, 2005) and the official 
NBA website (www.nba.com). Data for player salaries were coded from the USA Today Salaries 
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Database (2009) and Patricia Bender’s basketball website (2009). Data for ticket income were 
coded from annual reports by Financial World and Forbes. 
We tested our hypotheses with three sets of models. First, we predict product quality with 
an ordered logit and predict revenues with a regression model for panel data with fixed effects. 
These models were also used to conduct our mediation analysis. Second, we predict the 
likelihood that a team will recruit high-status or high-reputation players using multinomial logit 
models for panel data with random effects. Third, we predict the salary paid to a player with 
regression models for panel data with fixed effects. 
Dependent Variables 
Team product quality. We used performance in a season as our measure of a team’s 
product quality. We created an ordered variable, which took a value of 1 if the team did not 
qualify for the Playoffs, 2 if the team qualified for the Playoffs, 3 if the team advanced to the 
Conference Semifinals, 4 if the team advanced to the Conference Finals, 5 if the team advanced 
to the NBA Finals, and 6 if the team won the NBA Championship. This is the dependent variable 
we used to test H1a.  
Team revenues. We used the teams’ ticket income in a season as our measure of team 
revenues. Specifically, we used the log-transformation of the total ticket income (gate receipts) 
for a team for that season, excluding corporate seats because corporate seats are less sensitive to 
variation in team composition. We acknowledge that revenues result from not only people’s 
willingness to attend games of teams but also, for example, in their willingness to buy 
merchandise. Although this would provide an additional measure of revenues, merchandise sales 
data are not available. Accordingly, the log-transformed ticket income is the dependent variable 
we used to test H1b and H2. 
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Preference for high-reputation/high-status resource providers. We define a new player as 
someone who was playing for a different team in the previous season but is playing for the focal 
team in the current season. Although our high-status measure, as we will describe in detail 
below, is already a dichotomous variable, our measure for reputation is continuous. Therefore, 
for the purpose of constructing this dependent variable, we dichotomized our reputation measure 
so that a player was coded as being high-reputation if he was above the 85th percentile in the 
performance distribution of our reputation measure in the current season.2 Because a given high-
status player can also be a high-reputation player, and vice versa, we used more precise 
indicators in calculating our dependent variable. In particular, we first created the indicator 
variables new pure high-reputation player, which represents a new player who is high-reputation 
but not high-status, and new pure high-status player, which represents a new player who is high-
status but not high-reputation.3 We then used these indicator variables to construct a dependent 
variable, which was coded as -1 if the team recruited more “new pure high-reputation players” 
than “new pure high-status players,” as 0 if the team recruited the same number of players in 
these two categories (which could be zero for both), and as 1 if the team recruited more “new 
pure high-status players” than “new pure high-reputation players.” In other words, -1 indicates a 
preference for reputation over status, 1 indicates a preference for status over reputation, and 0 
indicates an equal preference for both. This is the dependent variable used to test H3a and H3b. 
Player salary. We used yearly salary figures in $US to test H4. To reduce the skewness 
of the distribution, we used the natural logarithm of salaries. 
Independent Variables 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 We chose the 85th percentile to keep the proportion of high-reputation players close to the proportion of high-status players. The results we 
report are the same (significant at p < .10 or higher) if we use 82.5%, 87.5%, or 75% as the cutoff for dichotomizing. The marginal significance is 
a result of the increased noise in the indicator variable, as it becomes less selective in categorizing players as high-reputation. This results in less 
difference between high-reputation and non-high-reputation categories and also in greater heterogeneity within the high-reputation category. 
3 In our player-level estimation sample of 2075 observations, 251 (12%) are both high-status and high-reputation, 94 (5%) are high-reputation but 
not high-status (“pure high-reputation”), 116 (6%) are high-status but not high-reputation (“pure high-status”), and 1614 (77%) are neither high-
status nor high-reputation.  
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Because many of the variables we use in our team-level estimations to test H1-H3 are 
built by aggregating player-level measures, we first list and describe the independent variables 
for the player-level models, followed by those for the team-level models. 
Independent variables for player salary models 
Player status. We measured player status using an indicator variable, which was coded 1 
for high-status players and 0 for non-high-status players. To determine whether a player was 
high-status, we used information on awards and team-selection honors in the NBA. In particular, 
we used data on the Most Valuable Player award (MVP), selection into the teams for the NBA 
All-Star Game, and selection into any of the All-NBA Teams (1st, 2nd, or 3rd). The winner of the 
MVP award is determined through votes cast by a panel of sportswriters and broadcasters 
throughout the United States and Canada. The starting players in the All-Star Game are chosen 
by a fan ballot whereby each position on the teams is filled by the player with the most votes for 
that position, and the reserves are chosen by the head coaches, who cannot vote for players on 
their own team. The compositions of the three All-NBA Teams are also determined by a panel of 
broadcasters in the United States and Canada. For each position, the player with the most votes 
gets selected for that position for the 1st team, the player with the second most votes gets selected 
into the 2nd team, and the player with the third most votes gets selected into the 3rd team.4  
If a player was selected for any of these honors in the previous three seasons, then we 
coded him as being high-status in the present season. Conversely, if a player was not selected for 
any of these honors during the previous three seasons, he would be considered non-high-status in 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4 For example: In the 2004-2005 season, the MVP was Steve Nash, the players on the three All-NBA Teams were (1st team) Tim Duncan, Dirk 
Nowitzki, Shaquille O’Neal, Allen Iverson, Steve Nash, (2nd team) LeBron James, Kevin Garnett, Amare Stoudemire, Dwyane Wade, Ray 
Allen, (3rd Team) Tracy McGrady, Shawn Marion, Ben Wallace, Kobe Bryant, Gilbert Arenas. In addition to the players we have listed, the 
teams in the NBA All-Star Game included Grant Hill, Vince Carter, Jermaine O’Neal, Zydrunas Ilgauskas, Paul Pierce, Antawn Jamison, Yao 
Ming, Ray Allen, Manu Ginobili, and Rashard Lewis. We do not use awards/honors focused on specific positions or tenure, such as “defense” or 
“rookies”, as we aim to construct a measure that is comparable across positions."
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the present season.5 We tried 3-, 5-, and 7-year moving windows as well as a fixed one whereby 
awards/honors are considered since the player’s entry in the NBA. Although all resulting 
measures produce consistent significant support for our hypotheses, we use the 3-year window 
for a number of reasons. First, this is a setting where the number of slots for these awards/honors 
– compared to the entire eligible population for the awards – is relatively high (about 10% of the 
population). Second, these awards are given every year, making it possible, and indeed not rare, 
for genuinely high-status players to accumulate multiple awards/honors over the years. Indeed, 
using the 3-year window, Kobe Bryant, Dwyane Wade, Tim Duncan, and Paul Pierce, for 
example, would be categorized as high-status every year from their first year of winning an 
award/honor onward. Third, of the four options, the 3-year window provided the greatest 
heterogeneity between high-status and non-high-status groups and the greatest homogeneity 
within the high-status group (as indicated by t-tests in which the measure used for heterogeneity 
and homogeneity was the cumulative number of awards/honors up to the present season).6  
Player reputation. We measure the reputation of a player in a given season with his 
average performance during the previous three seasons, adjusted by an annual decay function so 
that performance in the previous year is divided by one, performance two years ago is divided by 
two and so on. Performance in each season was measured by the Player Efficiency Rating (PER), 
developed by John Hollinger (2005).7 PER is a per-minute rating of a player’s performance, 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 We tried different combinations of awards as alternatives. Whether we used MVP, NBA All Star, and the 1st All NBA Team only, or added the 
2nd All NBA team, or also added the 3rd All NBA team (the measure we use), the correlations of the resulting measures are very high (r = .98), 
and the results remain the same and statistically significant as those we report. "
6"To illustrate this with an example, whereas the 3-year window differentiates between the group of Bryant, Wade, Duncan, Pierce and, for 
example, Juwan Howard and Jerry Stackhouse, a measure that categorizes players as high-status players from their first award/honor onward 
would not. Based on his 1996 All-Star appearance, Juwan Howard would be high-status in 1997, 1998, and 1999 but not onward based on the 3-
year window, whereas he would always remain a high-status player based on the alternative measure. According to the 3-year measure, Jerry 
Stackhouse is a high-status player in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, on account of his 2000 and 2001 appearances in the All-Star team, but he 
would also be high-status in every subsequent season up to his retirement with a fixed window measure. These differences suggest that widely 
accepted high-status players (e.g., Bryant, Wade, Duncan, Pierce) are indeed categorized as high-status in every year from their first award/honor 
year onward based on our 3-year window, whereas the same measure, we believe correctly, also differentiates between these players and those 
such as Juwan Howard and Jerry Stackhouse – categorized as high-status for the 3-years following their honors but not afterward."
7 Hollinger has been an NBA analyst since 1996. He has published four annual edition books analyzing the performance of NBA players and 
teams, and he currently writes for ESPN and the New York Sun. 
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standardized for each year. We provide a description of the calculation of PER, with all the 
formulae, in Appendix 1.  
Although no measure can comprehensively capture all of the dimensions of a player’s 
performance, we believe that the PER is a good measure of the performance of players. First, 
PER measures more than just points scored, which certainly represents an important component 
of a player’s overall performance but is not all of it. Some players help others to score or prevent 
the other team from scoring, and a performance measure based only on points scored would 
underestimate their performance. In our sample, the correlation between points scored and the 
PER is .64, which is lower than the correlation of .81 between points scored and, for example, 
the measure used to determine IBM Award winners (awarded by the NBA between 1983 and 
2002), which shows that PER captures other dimensions of a player’s skills. Second, the PER is 
highly correlated with other measures of players’ performance (i.e., toughness, quickness and 
scoring), as developed by Staw and Hoang (1995) in their analysis of playing time and survival 
in professional basketball. To assess the validity of our performance measure, we followed the 
methodology described by Staw and Hoang and calculated their three factors for our sample. 
Then, we summed these three factors to arrive at a single measure, whose correlation with PER 
is .80 (p < .001). Whereas Staw and Hoang developed the three factors as independent variables 
in their models to capture possible differences across positions, the PER was defined to capture 
overall performance regardless of a player’s position. For these reasons, we use the PER in 
measuring player performance to construct our reputation measure.  
Player-level control variables. We use an indicator variable to control for whether the 
current season is the player’s first season with his current team (First year in team). We also 
control for the natural logarithms of the player’s tenure with his team beyond the first season 
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(Team tenure) and the number of years the player has been in the NBA (NBA tenure) to capture 
experience effects on salary. Another factor that may affect a player’s salary is how much he was 
utilized in the previous season. Therefore, we control for the natural logarithm of the minutes 
(plus one) that a player has played for in the previous season (Past minutes played). We also 
control for a player’s performance beyond the previous three seasons by entering a variable, 
Player historical performance, which averages the player’s performance (PER) between the 
fourth and seventh seasons before the current season. Finally, we use an indicator variable (Free 
agent), which is set to 1 if the player was a free agent before the beginning of the current season 
and 0 otherwise to control for effects on a player’s salary based on whether he was a free agent.  
Team-level control variables. Players might accept a lower salary to play for a team with 
a long heritage, good recent performance or a history of championships won. Therefore, we 
include the natural logarithm of the number of years from the founding of the franchise (Team 
age), an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the team won the championship in the previous 
season (Team past champion) and 0 otherwise, an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the team 
qualified for the playoffs in the previous season (Team past playoffs) and 0 otherwise, and a 
variable that counts the cumulative number of times a team has won the NBA championship 
(Team cumulative championships). A player’s salary might also be affected by the performance 
of the players on the team who are in the same position as the player. Using the three positions of 
guard, center, and forward, we construct a control variable that represents the average reputation 
(performance in the past three years, weighed by an annual decay) of the players on his team in 
that season in his position (Team performance at position). We also include the team’s payroll in 
the current season in millions of dollars (Team payroll)8 and the team’s total revenues from all 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8 The results for our hypothesized effects do not change if we use a variable that sums the salaries of all the players except the focal player, rather 
than summing across all the players, or if we instead use the log transformation of either variable. 
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sources in the previous season, divided by ten million (Team total past revenue). Finally, we 
control for the population (Population), divided by 100,000, and the per capita income (Per 
capita income), divided by 10,000, of the city of the franchise, as reported by the US Census 
Bureau, the US Bureau of Labor statistics and Canada’s National Statistics Agency. 
Team indicators. We include an indicator variable for each team to capture the remaining 
heterogeneity across teams not captured by the other variables. 
Season indicators. We include an indicator variable for each season to capture possible 
variation in salary across seasons. 
Sample-selection variable. While there were rare instances where a player switched 
teams two or more times during a season, players played for a single team in 91% of the player-
season observations in our sample. To ensure the commensurability of our measures of players 
and teams, we focus on player-season observations where players did not change teams during 
the season. To address any potential bias (Heckman, 1979) introduced by our decision, we 
calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio (labeled Lambda, !) and include it in our estimation models. To 
calculate this variable, we added to the full specification (in Model 8) the number of games the 
player started in the previous season as the identifying variable. Players who start fewer games 
are utilized less by their teams and are thus more likely to be traded during a season. Lambda is 
then included in all player-level models.  
Independent variables for team product quality and team revenues 
Team status. We measured team status by the average status of the players on the team 
roster in that season. Because our player status measure is dichotomous, this measure is 
equivalent to the proportion of high-status players on the team roster.  
Team reputation. We measure reputation at the team level in a season by the average 
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reputation of the players on the team roster in that season. 
Control variables. We control for Team past playoffs, Team past champion, Team age, 
Team total past revenue, the proportion of players who are new in the team (Proportion of first-
year players in team), the average historical performance of the team’s players (Average 
historical performance), the average team tenure (Average team tenure) of players, and the 
average NBA tenure (Average NBA tenure) of players on the team. In the models predicting team 
revenues we also add the size of the stadium of the team (Stadium size) divided by 1000, and 
Population and Per capita income. In the models predicting team product quality, we add as a 
control variable the number of players on the team roster who are injured in the current season 
(Players injured). We used fixed-effects estimations where available or a full set of team 
indicator variables to further account for uncontrolled heterogeneity between teams. All the 
models also include a set of indicator variables to control for year fixed effects.  
Independent variables for preference for high-status/high-reputation players 
Product quality relative to aspirations. We use performance relative to the teams’ 
historical aspiration levels9 defined as a moving average of past product quality (Greve, 1998) 
and obtained using the following formula:  
 
Where A is the aspiration level, P is performance (product quality), t is the time period, 
and ! is an updating parameter. This parameter updates the previous aspiration levels by 
weighting the relevance of the additional information coming from recent performance. Low 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 Aspiration levels can be measured by social aspiration levels, historical aspiration levels, or a combination of both. Whereas most research has 
used a combination of the two, the performance to be measured was often market share or return on assets (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; 
Mishina et al., 2010; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009), where the average performance of all firms or firms in a peer group, i.e., for a social 
comparison, would change according to the change in the number of firms comprising the social comparison group. The number of NBA teams 
was stable throughout our observation period, which produces no substantive variance for social aspiration in team performance. However, in the 
case of revenues, the stadium size of teams plays an important role, not to mention the limited geographic span/reach of each team (it is not an 
option for most fans living in Dallas to choose between attending a basketball game between Dallas or Miami – the realistic option is whether to 
attend a game in Dallas or not to attend one at all). Therefore, we use historical aspiration levels to measure aspiration levels.  
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levels of the parameter, such as .25, mean that the decision maker puts less weight on recent 
performance information and is confident in relying on the previous aspiration level. Conversely, 
high levels of the parameter, such as .75, mean that the decision maker places more weight on 
recent performance information and relies less on the previous aspiration level (Greve, 2003b). 
To test the sensitivity of our results, we used .25, .50, and .75 for the updating parameter. 
Because the results were similar for all values, and because there exists no strong information to 
prefer a high or low updating parameter, we report the results obtained using a value of .50. To 
arrive at our final measure, we subtract a team’s past product quality (product quality in the 
previous season) from their historic aspiration level for product quality in the previous season. 
Revenues relative to aspirations. To measure a team’s aspiration level for revenues, we 
use historical aspirations as a moving average of past revenues, constructed in the same way as 
described in detail above for product quality aspirations. To arrive at our final measure, we 
subtract a team’s past revenues (revenues in the previous season) from their historic aspiration 
level for revenues in the previous season. 
Control variables. We control for Team age, Team total past revenue, Average historical 
performance, Team status, Team reputation, and the number of all new players recruited by the 
team in the current season (All new players). Finally, we enter one indicator variable per team to 
control for further unobserved heterogeneity between teams and a set of indicator variables to 
control for yearly fixed effects. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the summary statistics and correlations for the variables we use in 
estimating team-level and player-level models. The correlation between player reputation and 
player status, as presented in Table 2, is .62, showing that although our measures of the two 
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intangible assets are related, they are also distinct from each other, with only 38% of the variance 
in one being explained by the variance in the other and 62% of the variance attributable to other 
factors. Although we use the raw variables in reporting the correlations and the summary 
statistics, we orthogonalize our reputation and status measures (separately, both for the player-
level and the team-level models) before entering them in our models. In particular, we employ a 
Gram-Schmidt procedure (Golub & Van Loan, 1996), as implemented in the orthog command in 
Stata 11, which generates new orthogonalized measures for reputation and status, such that each 
captures variance not explained by a linear relationship with the other variable. This procedure 
has been used to obtain estimates for two or more variables when their correlation might have 
been a cause for concern (e.g., Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). 
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"
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Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the models predicting product quality and revenues 
for teams. Model 1 is the baseline model for predicting product quality. Teams that qualified for 
the playoffs or won the championship in the previous season, or consist of players with longer 
tenures in the NBA are more likely to have better performance. Model 2 adds the average status 
and average reputation of players on the team. Whereas the average reputation of players on the 
team has a positive and significant effect (p < .05), the average status of players on the team has 
no significant effect on season performance. We also ran this model using the non-
orthogonalized reputation and status variables. The results are the same: the average reputation 
of players on the team has a positive and significant effect (p < .05) whereas the average status of 
players on the team has no significant effect on season performance. These findings, that there is 
a positive and significant relationship between average reputation and team performance but no 
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significant relationship between average status and team performance, suggest support for H1a.10  
Whereas the sign and significance of orthogonalized variables can be interpreted 
conventionally, the interpretation of their magnitude is not as straightforward. Therefore, in 
comparing standardized effect sizes, we use the coefficients from estimations with non-
orthogonalized status and reputation variables. As we have noted above, the difference in the 
significance and non-significance is clear: the positive coefficient for reputation has a p-value of 
.015, whereas the non-significant coefficient for status has a p-value of .46, indicating that the 
effect of status cannot be estimated with any precision and the confidence intervals are very 
large. The standardized effect of reputation on product quality is 3.19 times that of the 
standardized effect of status on product quality. Because the standard error of the coefficient 
estimate of status is so large, as the p-value indicates, a t-test of the difference between the 
standardized effects is not significant. However, based on the clear differences in the 
significance and non-significance of coefficients and the 3.19 times difference in the 
standardized effects, we take these results to support H1a. To put the magnitude of the effect of 
reputation into context, a one-standard-deviation increase in the average reputation of a team’s 
players increases the log-odds of the team to progress to the next stage in the season by .50 (this 
figure is .33 if we use orthogonalized reputation; these effects are between one-half and one-third 
of the effect size of whether a team has advanced to the playoffs in the previous season). 
Model 3 is the baseline model for predicting revenues. Teams with higher total past 
revenues, those that qualified for the playoffs in the previous season, and those with larger 
stadiums have greater revenues from ticket sales. Model 4 adds team status and team reputation 
to model 3. Although the average status of players has a positive and significant effect (p < .01), 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10 We use a pooled ordered logit estimation because the test for pooling indicates clearly that the panel-level/longitudinal variance component for 
our model was not significant and, thus, that pooling was appropriate. A panel random-effects ordered-probit estimation provides consistent and 
significant results, although convergence in model estimation could be achieved only after removing some control variables.  
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the average reputation of players has no significant effect on ticket income. These results support 
H1b. As above, we also ran the same model using the non-orthogonalized average status and 
average reputation measures to compare differences in magnitude. Once again, the differences in 
significance and non-significance are clear: average status is a positive and significant (p < .01) 
predictor of ticket income, whereas average reputation has no significant association with ticket 
income (at only p < .23). The standardized effect of average status on revenues is 2.67 times that 
of average reputation. In this case, the t-test for the difference of these standardized effects 
provides marginal support for the statistical significance of this difference (p < .09). Whereas 
average reputation is not significant, the p-value of .23 keeps the standard error at a reasonable 
level, thus allowing us to show the statistical significance of the difference, clearly indicated by 
the 2.67 times greater standardized effect of status on revenues. The standardized effect of status 
on ticket income (5%) is as large as the effect of either total revenue in the previous season or 
whether a team has advanced to the playoffs during the previous season. In absolute dollars, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the status of players on the team is associated with an increase 
of $1.4 million in ticket income (these size comparisons are the same if we use coefficients from 
estimations with orthogonalized variables; for absolute effects, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in status is associated with a 6%, or $1.7 million, increase in ticket income). 
We also used Model 4 to test our mediation prediction formalized in H2. To capture 
actual product quality, we use the number of wins during the regular season in the current 
season. The correlations confirm that the number of wins during the current season is positively 
and significantly associated with ticket income (p < .001) as well as with team status and team 
reputation (p < .001). To study the extent of mediation of the effects of status and reputation on 
revenues through actual on-court performance, we follow MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
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West, and Sheets (2002) and use a Sobel (1982) test. The results show that the effects of both 
reputation and status on revenue are significantly (p < .05) mediated by the number of wins.11 
However, whereas only 16% of the total of effect of status is mediated, 41% of the total effect of 
reputation is mediated. As an alternative way of presenting the same result, the ratio of the 
indirect, i.e., mediated, effect to the direct effect for reputation is .97 (the direct effect is almost 
the same as the indirect effect) but is only .19 for status (the direct effect being almost five times 
stronger than the indirect effect). Using the win/loss percentage in the current season instead of 
the number of wins to measure on-court performance yields very similar results: 21% of the total 
effect of status on revenues is mediated by this variable, whereas 49% of the total effect of 
reputation is mediated by the same variable. These differences in the extent of mediation of the 
effects of status and reputation by actual current product quality support H2. 
Table 5 presents the results for the models predicting teams’ likelihood to prefer more 
pure high-reputation than pure high-status players, or vice versa, in their recruitment. The effects 
in the multinomial logit estimations are interpreted by comparing the preference for reputation 
and the preference for status to the baseline case of equal preference for the two intangible 
assets. Model 6 shows that product quality relative to aspirations has a negative effect (p < .05) 
on the preference for reputation over status. As product quality relative to aspirations increases 
(decreases), the team is less (more) likely to prefer reputation over status in their new player 
recruitment, supporting H3a. Moreover, revenues relative to aspirations has a negative effect (p < 
.05) on the preference for status over reputation, supporting H3b. As revenues relative to 
aspirations increases (decreases), the team is less (more) likely to prefer status over reputation.12 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11 As is standard, each mediation and the accompanying statistics are tested through three estimations: (a) revenues regressed on the specification 
in Model 4, (b) the number of wins, i.e., current product quality, regressed on the specification in Model 4, and (c) revenues regressed on the 
specification in Model 4, expanded by the number of wins.    
12 While our arguments and the mechanisms we propose in deriving H3a/b do not lead to different predictions for performance above/below the 
aspiration level but rather a consistent linear relationship, we nevertheless tried a spline specification in testing H3a/b. For each “performance 
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Table 6 presents the results for player salary models. Model 7 is the baseline model 
containing only the control variables. As expected, both player status and player reputation have 
positive and significant (p < .001) effects on a player’s salary. Model 8 adds the interaction 
between player status and player reputation. The interaction variable has a negative and 
significant coefficient (p < .001), suggesting that the positive effect of reputation on salary is 
significantly smaller for high-status players, providing support for H4. The coefficient suggests 
that for a high-status player (or for a one-standard-deviation increase in status) the effect of 
reputation on salary is reduced by 60%. To compare their effect sizes to some of the significant 
control variables, the standardized effects of status and reputation on salary (which are 9% or 
$.36 million and 14% or $.56 million, respectively) are larger than that of NBA tenure and are as 
large as the effects of team tenure and team past total revenue.13 
Figure 1 graphs the effect of reputation on a player’s salary, using the coefficients from 
Model 8. High-status and non-high-status players are those players whose value is one standard 
deviation above and one below the mean, respectively. All other variables with significant 
coefficients are at their mean value. The figure shows that reputation has a stronger effect on 
salary for non-high-status players than for high-status ones. An increase of reputation from one 
standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean produces a 55% salary 
increase for non-high-status players and a 13% salary increase for high-status ones (equivalent to 
$.49 and $.16 million USD, respectively).  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
relative to aspiration level” variable, the spline specification requires splitting it such that the “above” variable is zero whenever “performance 
relative to aspiration level” is zero or below zero and is equal to the actual value whenever it is positive; and the “below” variable is zero 
whenever the “performance relative to aspiration level” is zero or above zero and is equal to the actual value (multiplied by -1 for the variable to 
remain positive) whenever it is negative. The results we obtain by substituting these spline variables for each of the “relative to aspiration level” 
variables are significant and consistent with our main results. Both of the “revenues relative to aspiration level” split variables have significant 
and negative effects on status preference but not on reputation preference. Both of the ”product quality relative to aspiration” split variables have 
negative effects on reputation preference (with one being significant and the other short of marginal significance) but not on status preference.       
13 If we use non-orthogonalized status and reputation variables in estimating Model 8, we get similarly strong statistical support for the effects of 
status, reputation, and the interaction (all p < .001). Likewise, both the magnitude of the moderation effect and the comparison of effect sizes with 
the three control variables are equally strong, i.e., the reputation effect becomes reduced by more than 60% for high-status players, and the 
standardized effect of reputation (which is 22% or $.88 million) is equal to or larger than those of the three control variables mentioned, as is the 
effect of a switch from a non-high-status to high-status player. 
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Robustness checks 
We assessed the robustness of our results in a number of ways. Starting with H1a/b, as 
alternative ways to measure product quality (team performance), we used (a) an indicator 
dependent variable for whether the team advanced to the playoffs (estimated with a logit, using 
the same specification in Model 2), (b) the team’s ranking in its division at the end of the regular 
season (reverse coded, predicted using an ordered logit, using the same specification in Model 
2), or (c) the team’s number of wins at the end of the regular season (predicted using a panel 
negative binomial regression with team fixed effects, using the same specification in Model 2). 
With any of these alternative dependent variables, the results are consistent with those we report. 
Team reputation has a significant positive effect on team performance (p < .05), whereas team 
status has no significant effect. If we use the non-log-transformed ticket income (instead of the 
log-transformation) to measure revenues in Model 4, our results remain unchanged: team status 
has a significant positive effect (p < .05), whereas team reputation has no significant effect. 
In predicting preference for high-reputation/high-status players in Models 5 and 6, the 
results we report remain the same if we do not consider players who are both high-reputation and 
high-status or those who are neither high-reputation nor high-status in calculating the baseline, 
“0,” outcome. If we remove either or both of these sets of players from the sample as we 
construct the dependent variable for the multinomial logit estimation, the results we report 
remain the same: product quality relative to aspirations has a negative effect (p < .05) on the 
preference for reputation over status, whereas revenues relative to aspirations have no significant 
effect. Revenues relative to aspirations have a negative effect (p < .05) on the preference for 
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status over reputation, whereas product quality relative to aspirations has no significant effect.  
In the salary models, Models 7 and 8, we added a variable that captures the salary cap for 
each season. This procedure results in strong multicollinearity, leading many year indicators to 
be dropped. In this model, the salary cap has a negative effect on player salary. However, the 
coefficient of our hypothesized interaction effect remains negative and significant (p < .001). 
Removing year indicators and re-estimating the model with the salary cap yields a consistent and 
significant (p < .001) result for our hypothesized interaction effect, although the salary cap now 
has the expected positive coefficient, albeit not significant. Because the year indicators capture 
additional season-specific factors, and because adding salary cap with the year indicators results 
in severe multicollinearity, we report results only for models with year indicators.  
The 1999 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) introduced provisions for maximum 
individual player salaries. Although there are exceptions to these provisions, we nevertheless 
assessed whether such provisions change our results by adding a variable that measures what the 
CBA sets as maximum salary (with three bands based on the player’s NBA experience) to Model 
8. As with the salary cap, the addition of maximum salary results in high collinearity and the 
dropping of many year indicators. When we remove the year indicators, maximum salary has a 
positive but not significant effect on annual salary. However, in either specification, H4 
continues to receive significant support (p < .001).14 We also performed similar robustness 
checks for possible minimum salary effects, and H4 again received significant support.  
It may be argued that our reputation measure focuses narrowly on individual player 
performance and insufficiently on his overall contribution to team performance. Assuming that 
teams utilize players who make a positive contribution to the team more often, which would be 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 To further test for the possible effects of maximum salary provisions, we re-estimated Model 8 on samples consisting of observations for 
player-years for salaries that are below a certain upper (ranging from $14 million to $20 million) limit, resulting in the reduction of our sample by 
up to 2.8%. As with our other checks, we also found support for H4 (p < .01) in these estimations. 
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captured by past minutes played, we constructed a new measure for reputation using both the 
average PER during the previous three seasons (with an annual decay) and past minutes played. 
This measure was constructed by using the scores from a principal component factor analysis of 
the two variables and correlates .88 with either variable. Using this measure in Model 8 as a 
measure of player reputation, and removing past minutes played, as it is now part of this 
variable, yields the same results. Player reputation and player status have significant positive 
effects (p < .001) on salary and their interaction has a significant negative effect (p < .001). 
Arguably, a player’s salary might depend not on the absolute level of his reputation but 
rather on his position-specific reputation relative to the other players in the league. Using the 
three positions of guard, center, and forward, we generated yearly, i.e., season-varying, average 
measures for each position and adjusted the focal player’s reputation by subtracting the relevant 
position-specific average from the player’s own reputation. This position-adjusted reputation 
variable is highly correlated with our original variable, and the pattern of results is exactly the 
same: reputation (p < .001) and status (p < .01) have positive effects on salary, whereas their 
interaction (p < .001) has a negative effect. Alternatively, added on its own to Model 8, the 
season-varying average position-specific reputation has no significant effect on salary, and our 
original reputation (p < .001) and status (p < .05) variables retain their positive effects, whereas 
the hypothesized negative interaction effect also remain highly significant (p < .001).  
Because we use fixed-effects panel regressions with robust clustered-errors in estimating 
Model 8 (player salary) and Model 4 (team revenues), we also checked using an Arellano-Bond 
estimation whether the addition of a one-period lagged dependent variable to the predictors 
yields consistent results. In both Model 8 (testing H4) and Model 4 (testing H1b), the results are 
consistent with those we report. The interaction between reputation and status in Model 8 has a 
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negative and significant coefficient (p < .05). Status has a positive and significant effect in 
Model 4 (p < .001), whereas reputation has no significant effect. 
Finally, it may cause concern that the correlations between team payroll and team total 
past revenue and between first year in team and team tenure (in Models 7-8) and the correlation 
between proportion of first year players in team and average team tenure (in Models 1-4) are 
relatively high. For each of the three pairs, we orthogonalized the two variables, removing 
common variance between them. Using the resulting variables did not change our results, which 
continue to provide significant (p < .05) support for our hypothesized effects. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we explore how two intangible assets, reputation and status, affect different 
organizational outcomes, how organizations’ performance on these different outcomes 
determines the acquisition of resources from providers possessing these assets, and how these 
assets affect the price paid to obtain resources from a provider. In particular, we argued that 
because reputation and status are intangible assets that produce benefits to the organization that 
hires the resource providers who possess them, resources from high-reputation providers have a 
greater effect on the quality of an organization’s final products than resources from high-status 
providers, and resources from high-status providers have a greater effect on an organization’s 
revenues than resources from high-reputation providers. Given the tighter link between 
reputation and product quality, we also argued that the effect of reputation on revenues will be 
mediated by the actual quality of the organization’s final products more than the effect of status 
on revenues. Because the two intangible assets have different effects on organizational outcomes 
and to the extent that organizations have different goals they want to achieve, we also argued that 
organizations with low quality performance relative to their aspiration levels are likely to recruit 
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more high-reputation providers than high-status ones, whereas organizations with low revenue 
performance relative to their aspiration levels are likely to recruit more high-status resource 
providers than high-reputation ones. Finally, we argued that organizations use both reputation 
and status to evaluate the quality of resources obtained from a resource provider and that 
organizations consider the levels of these intangible assets interdependently when determining 
the price to pay for a resource.  
We see several important contributions of this study. First, we extend the research on the 
relationship between reputation and status. Rather than focusing on whether these intangible 
assets are used independently (Washington & Zajac, 2005) or sequentially (Jensen & Roy, 2008) 
in determining the value of an exchange partner, we have studied the interdependent role they 
play in determining the price paid to resource providers. Our results suggest that firms are aware 
of the different roles that these intangible assets play in determining their performance on two 
types of outcomes. Reputation allows firms to increase their product quality, whereas status 
allows them to increase their revenues. For these reasons, there is an interdependence between 
their effects: as status increases, the link between pay and reputation is weaker.  
Second, previous research has considered that firms associate with different types of 
actors because these different types can help organizations to achieve their goals by providing 
different intangible assets (Pollock et al., 2010). We explicitly consider that the same type of 
resource provider might possess different intangible assets at different levels and that the 
decision to hire them is based upon the firms’ need for one asset or the other. Firms may not 
want or need to consider alternative types of actors to provide different benefits, instead focusing 
on one type of resource provider, as long as that type can provide different intangible assets.  
Third, we confirm and substantiate the active role that organizations play in changing 
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their intangible assets base to remedy difficult situations. Chen and his colleagues (2008) have 
shown that firms hire prestigious executives as a dressing up of the company before IPO to 
remedy a scarcity of pre-existing prestige. Our results confirm not only that firms hire resource 
providers when their performance on some outcomes is low relative to their aspiration level but 
also that they act selectively to remedy the most pressing outcome-related issue they face.  
Fourth, our results also extend and clarify our knowledge on the role of certification on 
the performance of organizations. In a paper on CEO compensation, Wade and his colleagues 
(2006) found that CEO certification generates abnormal short-term returns in the stock market 
but does not have any effect on firms’ profitability. Although certification is initially valued by 
shareholders as indicating the quality of the new CEO, it does not really produce any difference 
in a firm’s ability to generate higher profits. Our results extend these findings by showing that 
status is valued by relevant audiences – i.e., fans – who generate higher revenues for the 
organization. However, we find that status has little bearing on the quality of the firm’s products. 
By explicitly considering both status and reputation, we show that it is primarily reputation that 
allows the firm to increase the quality of its products, whereas status generates greater revenues, 
which are mediated much less by the actual quality of the product, as H2 predicts. Therefore, 
firms should focus on the type of objective they wish to achieve and hire accordingly. It is 
possible that if firms wish to increase the quality of their products, and to the extent that a CEO 
is expected to engage in activities to affect it, firms might hire high-reputation CEOs, regardless 
of their certification. Wade and his colleagues (2006) also show that compensation is higher for 
certified CEOs than non-certified ones when performance is high but is lower when performance 
is low. Although this finding might well be caused by the burden of celebrity, our results might 
suggest, alternatively, that it is possible that reputation could be the main driver of compensation 
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when status is low or when certification is absent. Insofar as a firm’s quality is determined by 
CEO reputation, low compensation might be the product of poor CEO abilities.  
Fifth, this paper contributes to our understanding of myopic search (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Research has shown that problemistic search is plagued by temporal myopia, whereby 
firms tend to focus on the short run (Greve, 2008), spatial myopia, whereby firms tend to focus 
on effects near the problem (Miller, Meng, & Calantone, 2006), and failure myopia, whereby 
firms focus more on successes than failures (Danneels, 2008). We provide an additional test of 
spatial myopia by showing that firms with multiple goals focus on one outcome at a time. When 
seeking a solution to a performance problem, firms are more likely to acquire resources that 
address this problem but not resources that might improve their performance on the other goals.  
Finally, this paper contributes to the economic literature on “superstars,” which argues 
(see, for example, Adler, 1985) that income is distributed disproportionally to some individuals 
even when their level of talent is the same as that of others. One reason for such a distribution is 
that consumption requires knowledge by the consumers, who need to acquire it through 
interactions with other consumers. We extend this argument by showing that even when there is 
explicit and shared knowledge about the talents of individuals, such as in our context, where 
performance is clearly available, certain individuals with the same talent may still have a higher 
income. Our results suggest that this is due to the role of certification, whereby organizations are 
willing to pay more for high-status individuals because of the revenue benefits they produce.  
We acknowledge that the sample we have selected for this study has some idiosyncratic 
features that might make it difficult to reproduce our results exactly in other settings. As a 
consequence, we are cautious about claiming empirical generality for the results we report. First, 
not many industries have, as in the NBA, both detailed statistics available for each player and 
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team, resulting in observable indicators for the quality of resources, and perceptual evaluations 
of the quality of players. If, on the one hand, this might be seen as limiting the generalizability of 
our findings, on the other hand, it allows us to clearly distinguish between reputation and status 
and to provide a clean test of our arguments. We predict that the status-related mechanisms 
emphasized in this paper will be even more relevant in contexts where the quality of resources 
obtained is not as observable. Second, not every industry has the same level of contractual 
complications as the NBA. While collective bargaining in the NBA could be considered to be 
similar to collective bargaining in other industries, the presence of a soft salary cap, of minimum 
and maximum salary provisions, and the many exceptions to the cap and the provisions may 
make the salary paid to players less flexible than in other industries. Although we have taken 
many steps to control for such constraints, it may be difficult to generalize the results to 
industries with no such regulations. Third, this industry, like any other sport, may be rather 
unusual in the ability that star employees have to attract attention. The certification of players 
seems particularly relevant in this industry, where audiences want to see high-status players on 
TV and on the court, thereby generating higher revenues. Although there are similarities with 
CEOs, prominent executives, venture capitalists, and security analysts, the results of this paper 
are bound by those industries where uncertainty in the quality of the resources employed may 
generate high pay for a small set of individuals. Fourth, one of the underlying assumptions of the 
paper is that there is homogeneity in how high-reputation players produce their quality. Ideally, 
the effort or shirking of players should also be considered when studying the effects of reputation 
on substantive benefits. Fifth, we used ticket revenues as a proxy for firm revenue. Although we 
could not obtain such data, other streams of revenues, such as merchandise revenues, should be 
included in the measure. Finally, we did not consider complementarities when determining a 
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player’s value for the team. Future research should explore how the extent to which a player’s 
skill set complements those of others on the team might affect his salary. 
In conclusion, our study illustrates the importance of separating the benefits received 
through high-status and high-reputation resource providers. Doing so also allows us to predict 
and observe how the effects of one intangible asset may depend on another when organizations 
pay their resource providers. Our study thus extends our understanding of the benefits that 
organizations have in obtaining resources from high-reputation and high-status resource 
providers and how reputation and status determine the organizational decisions of hiring and pay. 
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TABLE 3: ORDERED LOGIT    TABLE 4: FIXED-EFFECTS  
MODELS ESTIMATING PRODUCT  REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING 
QUALITY (SEASON PERFORMANCE)•  REVENUES (TICKET INCOME)! 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2  Variables Model 3 Model 4 
Team status  .35  Team status  .06** 
  (.20)    (.02) 
Team reputation  .34*  Team reputation  .01 
  (.14)    (.01) 
       
Team past playoffs 1.29*** 1.10**  Team past playoffs .09** .07* 
 (.33) (.35)   (.03) (.03) 
Team past champion 2.01* 2.19*  Team past champion .09 .11 
 (.89) (.96)   (.06) (.06) 
Team age -1.11 -1.19  Team age -.32 -.37 
 (1.58) (1.56)   (.22) (.20) 
Team total past revenue -.02 -.02  Team total past revenue .005* .004* 
 (.01) (.01)   (.002) (.001) 
Average historical .15 .01  Average historical .02 .01 
performance (.13) (.14)  performance (.01) (.01) 
       
Proportion of first-year 
players on team 
-2.73 
(1.95) 
-2.85 
(2.09) 
 Proportion of first-year 
players on team 
-.06 
(.12) 
-.08 
(.12) 
       
Average team tenure .08 -.15  Average team tenure .02 -.03 
 (.65) (.70)   (.05) (.05) 
Average NBA tenure 1.88* 1.80**  Average NBA tenure .10 .06 
 (.80) (.83)   (.06) (.06) 
Players injured .05 .09  Stadium size .07*** .06*** 
 (.10) (.10)   (.02) (.02) 
    Population .01 .01 
     (.01) (.01) 
    Per capita income -.01 -.01 
     (.01) (.01) 
    Constant 15.94*** 16.47*** 
     (1.14) (1.08) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -357.18 -353.41     
Pseudo R-squared .19 .20  R-squared (within) .75 .77 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
•!n = 313. Clustered robust standard errors, adjusted for non-independence across same-team observations, in parentheses. 
Unreported season and team indicator variables are included in all models. 
Two-tailed tests. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001!
!
!!n = 274. Clustered robust standard errors, adjusted for non-independence across same-team observations, in parentheses. 
Unreported season indicator variables are included in all models. Team-level fixed-effects are incorporated into the estimations. 
Two-tailed tests. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 
All nested models in both sets of estimations provide a significant improvement in fit (p < .001).!
! "$!
TABLE 5: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS ESTIMATING  
PREFERENCE FOR HIGH-REPUTATION OR HIGH-STATUS PLAYERS• 
Variables Model 5 Model 6 
Outcome = -1 (reputation preference)   
Revenues relative to aspirations  -1.34 
  (1.95) 
Product quality relative to aspirations  -.52* 
  (.24) 
Team reputation .61 .49 
 (.36) (.36) 
Team status -.31 -.24 
 (.33) (.30) 
Team age 2.58 2.00 
 (5.09) (4.82) 
Total past revenue .04 .05 
 (.04) (.04) 
All new players .25 .26* 
 (.13) (.11) 
Average historical performance -.31 -.39 
 (.20) (.22) 
Constant -13.29 -11.08 
 (20.63) (19.97) 
   
Outcome = 1 (status preference)   
Revenues relative to aspirations  -20.72* 
  (10.08) 
Product quality relative to aspirations  1.38 
  (.72) 
Team reputation .23 .19 
 (.62) (.95) 
Team status 4.87* 13.47* 
 (1.96) (6.26) 
Team age -23.72** -64.13** 
 (8.34) (20.99) 
Total past revenue .23** .69* 
 (.08) (.32) 
All new players 1.06* 2.77* 
 (.49) (1.39) 
Average historical performance -.95 -2.95 
 (.68) (1.91) 
Constant 73.50* 196.87** 
 (29.15) (62.64) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -72.26 -64.32 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
•!n = 297. Clustered robust errors, adjusted for non-independence across same-team observations, in parentheses. Unreported season and team 
indicator variables are included in all models. Two-tailed tests. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
There is a significant improvement in fit from Model 5 to Model 6 (p < .01). 
 
The baseline outcome (Outcome = 0) is an equal number of new hires who are pure high-reputation (high-reputation but not high-status) and pure 
high-status (high-status but not high-reputation). Outcome = -1 is the hiring of more new pure high-reputation than new pure-high status players, 
i.e., reputation preference. Outcome = 1 is the hiring of more new pure high-status than new pure high-reputation players, i.e., status preference.!
! "%!
TABLE 6: FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING  
PLAYER SALARY• 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 
Player reputation .14*** .14*** 
 (.04) (.04) 
Player status .12*** .09** 
 (.03) (.03) 
Player reputation * Player status  -.08*** 
  (.02) 
Player historical performance .03* .03* 
 (.01) (.01) 
First year in team .09 .12 
 (.09) (.09) 
Team tenure .12* .13** 
 (.05) (.05) 
NBA tenure 1.27*** 1.34*** 
 (.34) (.33) 
Past minutes played .06* .06* 
 (.03) (.03) 
Free agent -.34*** -.33*** 
 (.04) (.04) 
Team age .04 .06 
 (.22) (.22) 
Team past champion -.11 -.10 
 (.07) (.07) 
Team past playoffs -.12*** -.12*** 
 (.04) (.04) 
Team cumulative championships .03 .03 
 (.05) (.05) 
Team performance at position -.03* -.03* 
 (.01) (.01) 
Team payroll .23* .23* 
 (.09) (.09) 
Team past total revenue .01 .01 
 (.01) (.01) 
Population -.03 -.03 
 (.02) (.02) 
Per capita income -.01 .01 
 (.16) (.16) 
! -.68* -.73* 
 (.32) (.32) 
Constant 7.28*** 7.03*** 
 (2.11) (2.10) 
R-squared (within) 0.299 0.308 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
•!n = 2075. Clustered robust errors, adjusted for non-independence across same-player observations, in parentheses. Unreported season and team 
indicator variables are included in all models. Player-level fixed effects are incorporated into the estimations.  
There is a significant improvement in fit from Model 7 to Model 8 (p < .01). 
Two-tailed tests. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001!
! &'!
 
 
FIGURE 1: THE EFFECT OF REPUTATION ON SALARY FOR DIFFERENT STATUS 
LEVELS 
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APPENDIX 1: CALCULATING THE PLAYER EFFICIENCY RATING (PER) 
 
First, uPER is calculated as follows: 
 
uPER = (1/MP) * [3P + (2/3) * AST + (2 - factor * (team_AST / team_FG)) * FG 
+ (FT *0.5 * (1 + (1- (team_AST / team_FG)) + (2/3) * (team_AST / team_FG))) 
- VOP * TOV - VOP * DRB% * (FGA - FG) - VOP * 0.44 * (0.44 + (0.56 * DRB%)) * (FTA - 
FT) + VOP * (1 - DRB%) * (TRB - ORB) + VOP * DRB% * ORB + VOP * STL + VOP * 
DRB% * BLK - PF * ((lg_FT / lg_PF) - 0.44 * (lg_FTA / lg_PF) * VOP)] 
 
Where: 
 
Factor  = (2 / 3) - (0.5 * (lg_AST / lg_FG)) / (2 * (lg_FG / lg_FT)) 
VOP  = lg_PTS / (lg_FGA - lg_ORB + lg_TOV + 0.44 * lg_FTA) 
DRB%  = (lg_TRB - lg_ORB) / lg_TRB 
 
Once uPER is calculated, it is adjusted for team pace and normalized to the league to become: 
 
PER = [uPER * (lg_pace/tmPace)] * (15/lg_uPER) 
 
Where tmPace is an estimate of the number of possessions per 48 minutes by a team, calculated 
as follows: 
 
tmPace = 48 * (Tm Poss + Opp Poss) / (2 * (Tm MP /5), which sets the league average (of PER) 
to 15 for all seasons. 
 
The abbreviations in the formulae above stand for the following: 
 
MP – Minutes played     team_AST – Team total assists 
AST – Assists      team_FG – Team total field goals  
FG – Field goals     lg_FT – League total free throws 
FT – Free throws     lg_FTA – League total free throw attempts 
FTA – Free throw attempts    lg_PF – League total personal fouls 
VOP – Value of possession    lg_AST – League total assists 
TOV – Turnovers     lg_FG – League total field goals 
DRB – Defensive rebounds    lg_FGA – League total field goal attempts 
ORB – Offensive rebounds    lg_PTS – League total points 
TRB – Total rebounds    lg_TRB – League total rebounds 
BLK – Blocks      lg_ORB – League total offensive rebounds 
PF – Personal fouls     lg_TOV – League total turnovers 
PTS – Points      lg_uPER – League average uPER 
STL – Steals  
TOV – Turnovers 
Tm Poss – Team possession  
Tm MP – Team total minutes played 
Opp Poss – Opponent possession  
 
! &)!
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